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1. Introduction
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, pre-crisis asset price trends have attracted substantial interest
in the academic literature (Shiller, 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2010, 2014; Jorda´ et al., 2015; Knoll et al., 2017).
Most of these scholarly endeavors document that asset price bubbles are one of the major signals of economic
fragility prior to financial crises (Mian and Sufi, 2010; Jorda´ et al., 2015). Projecting how prices of different
asset classes respond to recovery efforts following a crisis is important because how they rebound has a
profound effect on post-crises wealth redistribution. Such reallocation, in due course, has a knock-on effect
on economic and social inequality. However, we know very little about how asset prices behave after shocks.
While there was minimal government intervention until the 1930s, in the second half of the twentieth
century both monetary and fiscal policies were increasingly employed by governments to stabilize crisis
affected economies. One can presume that the impacts of such stabilization policies are likely to be asym-
metric across various asset markets and crises types. If recovery in house and equity prices is asymmetric,
this will amplify inequality in post-recession economic regimes. This influences inequality because while
lower and middle-income families are more likely to have their wealth invested in a home, higher income
families invest more in financial instruments like stocks. Hence, comparatively more persistent downturns
in the housing sector exacerbate the wealth gap and social inequality (Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Piketty,
2014). Consequently, studying post-crises asset price trends is important from both policy and scholarly
perspectives. The present study fills this void in the literature by investigating an intriguing question; how
key asset prices behave following different types of shocks.
Crises come in different shapes and sizes. Rietz (1988) first introduced extreme events in the macro-
finance literature. Following Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Barro (2009), Barro and Ursu´a (2012) popularized
the concept of a ‘rare macroeconomic disaster,’ arguing that they may explain a wide range of asset-pricing
puzzles. Barro and Ursu´a (2012) defined these disasters as, ‘major disaster events exemplified by the world
wars and the Great Depression.’ More recently, Jorda´ et al. (2015) and Funke et al. (2016) have divided
recessions into financial crises and non-financial macroeconomic disasters. Consequently, this paper is built
on these crises categorization schemes and classifies macroeconomic downturns into three distinct groups:
normal recessions, financial recessions, and disasters. In this backdrop of asset classes and crises types, this
study examines how different classes of asset prices (house and equity) behave in the aftermath of each crisis
types (normal recessions, financial recessions and macro-disasters). For this purpose, this study combined
three recently available historical datasets into one comprehensive database covering 17 western economies
over a period of 143 years and employed a relatively new empirical local projection technique.
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This research contributes to our understanding of post-crisis asset price trends in at least two important
ways. First, this study examines the impact of three different classes of crisis on two different asset classes.
Second, to this end it employs a relatively advanced econometric technique, namely Jorda´ (2005)’s local
projection, in order to study post-recession asset prices over a long period. Tracing impulse responses of
asset price paths based on local projections offers favorable statistical properties if there are asymmetries,
nonlinearities and model misspecification (Jorda´, 2005; Jorda´ et al., 2015; Funke et al., 2016).
This study finds that financial recessions are the most detrimental of the three types of crisis, causing
substantial decreases in house prices, stock prices and construction costs. The prominence of financial crises
in the business cycle is documented in earlier works by Fisher (1933), Minsky (1986), Leamer (2007), Jorda´
et al. (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Muir (2017). This could be because a financial crisis
is associated with increased uncertainty about the macro-financial outlook and intense media speculations.
Our results document that post-crisis stock price declines are observed through the whole sample period,
i.e. both pre-World War II and post-World War II (WWII, hereafter), whereas both house prices and
construction costs are more vulnerable to crises after WWII. This could be due to the increased leverage
in housing markets in recent decades, leading to house price booms which result in events like ‘bubbles
bursting.’
This research also finds that stock prices drop substantially immediately after financial crises and rebound
within four to six years, but shocks to house prices are more persistent. As equity investments are often made
with comparatively short-term intent and are transacted in almost real time, stock prices react immediately
to any macro financial changes. The greater persistence of house prices is documented by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009a). The sheer size and complexity of the housing market could impede the ability of stabilization
measures to have an immediate impact on house prices. Our study finds that in periods after WWII, both
house prices and their construction costs fall after each of the three types of crisis. However, while house price
falls are largest after financial recessions, construction costs decrease most after non-financial disasters. This
could reflect that house prices are more susceptible to uncertainty during adverse financial events, whereas
construction costs are more prone to supply disruptions during non-financial disasters like war and natural
calamities.
Existing studies mainly focus on pre-and-post-crisis trends in major macroeconomic aggregates like GDP,
inflation, investment and unemployment (Romer, 1986; Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Basu and Taylor, 1999;
Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a,b; Teulings and Zubanov, 2010; Jorda´ et al., 2011;
Schularick and Taylor, 2012, and others). More recently, some studies have linked political outcomes with
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crises periods (Funke et al., 2016; Mian et al., 2014). There are very few studies that examine post-crisis asset
price trends. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) studied 22 (systematic) banking crises post WWII to identify
the magnitude and persistence of their impact on house and equity price cycles as well as unemployment
and income. They found that following financial crises ‘asset market collapses are deep and prolonged.’
Goetzmann and Kim (2018) studied crashes using data from 101 global stock markets between 1692 and
2015. Using conditional distributions methodology, they found that large, annual stock market declines
(negative bubbles) were typically followed by positive returns. While they considered a long period, their
study only included a rapid and unusually large decline in a national stock market index. In contrast, this
present study analyses both stock and housing market responses after three types of crisis. This study also
differs from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) in several aspects; it considers three types of shocks instead of
only a banking crisis, and the crises data set used here includes a wide range of shocks over a much longer
time. With regards to analysis techniques, while they employ very basic percentile and averaging exercises
to identify the impact and duration of the effect of a systematic financial crisis in the context of an individual
country, this study undertakes a local projections technique within a panel of 17 countries over a period of
143 years. Muir (2017) analyzes the behavior of risk premia in financial crises, wars, and recessions in an
international panel spanning over 140 years and 14 countries. However, this study did not look at house
prices.
In summary, this study put together three recently available historical datasets to develop a comprehen-
sive database consisting of macroeconomics, housing, equity and political variables over more than 140 years
and notably includes the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. Furthermore, the housing database
has aggregate house prices as well as its disentangled components i.e. land price and construction cost. In
our analysis, in addition to financial crisis, we consider the impact of normal recessions and non-financial
disasters. Comparing normal with financial recessions enables us to develop a cleaner identification of the
effects of financial crises than comparing crisis periods to counter factual of all other years. On the empirical
side, this study undertakes local projection analyses due to Jorda´ (2005) to project five and ten year paths
of house and equity prices following the beginning of three different types of crisis. Hence, this study traces
post-crises asset prices using a statistically advanced technique with a comprehensive historical data set.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of two major
crises the world economy has gone through in the last century. Section 3 offers definitions for three types
of crisis studied in this paper. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses empirical strategies and
Sections 6 and 7 summarize our findings and provide conclusions.
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2. Crises Explained: Normal Recessions, Financial Crisis and Non-Financial Recessions
Following Funke et al. (2016), this study defines financial crises as periods when the economy experiences
events like, increased default rates associated with large capital losses fueling public intervention, bank runs
and bankruptcy or forced merger of financial institutions. Dates are matched with Jorda´ et al. (2013) and
presented in Appendix Table A3. While historical crisis events are identified through Bordo et al. (2001) and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b), the post-1970 data set of systematic banking crises is gathered from Valencia
and Laeven (2008) and Valencia and Laeven (2012). In addition to financial crisis dates, this paper identifies
the dates of recessions following Funke et al. (2016).
Recessions are identified through the basic intuition of Bry and Boschan (1971)’s algorithms where a
peak represents a local maximum and a trough represents a local minimum in real GDP per capita. This
paper defines recession as the period between a peak and the following trough and expansion as the period
between a trough and the subsequent peak. We then make a distinction between normal and financial crisis
recessions. To elaborate, once recessions are identified, we distinguish financial crisis recessions as the ones
where a financial crisis occurred within a two year window and a normal recession which is not associated
with any financial crisis event. A full list of normal and financial crisis recession dates are provided in
Appendix Table 4.
In the spirit of Barro (2006), Barro and Ursu´a (2008) and Barro and Ursu´a (2012), this study also com-
pares financial recessions to another subset of normal recessions that are infrequent and large in magnitude
(Barro (2006) termed them as ‘Rare Macroeconomic Disasters’). Keeping in line with Funke et al. (2016) we
term these rare disasters as non-financial macro disasters. They are disasters as they are those non-financial
recessions which experience a higher than average GDP decline during financial recessions. Depending on
asymmetry in magnitudes of pre-and post-WWII recessions, we apply two separate cut-offs for the pre-
WWII sample (with a threshold of 3.35%) and the post-WWII period (with -2.55% as the threshold). A
list of these disasters are offered in Appendix Table A5.1
3. Data
This paper makes use of three very recently available historical databases: Jorda´ et al. (2015) macro-
financial data set, the house price data set offered by Knoll et al. (2017) and the political data set by Funke
et al. (2016). The combined database covers 17 countries over the period from 1870 to 2013. Hence, it
1A detailed explanation about crisis designation and classification is offered in Appendix A9.
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includes the recent global financial crisis and its aftereffects. Figure 1 plots the consumer price index, house
prices and stock prices for individual countries. A quick glimpse of the trend lines offers four important
insights:
1) trends in each of these series differ between pre-WWII and post-WWII.
2) after WWII, the series show steeper upward trends for most of the countries.
3) during the second half of the twentieth century, there is substantial heterogeneity of the increasing
trends among countries depending on when the upward swings began.
4) equity prices are generally more volatile than house prices.
[Figure 1]
One of the explanations for house prices being more persistent than equity prices could be the land
component of house prices. This study analyses both land and construction cost components of house
prices. The variables employed along with their descriptions and sources are provided in Appendix Table
A1. Adding up three long historical databases enables us to get 1855 country-year house prices and 2139
country-year equity prices. In particular, by combining these three datasets, this research obtains the largest
historical asset price-macro-finance-political data set of its kind. Summary statistics of these variables are
provided in Appendix Table A2.
The macro-finance-political data set that this study put together offers some favorable features under
important circumstances:
1) models based on universal economic mechanisms of the business cycle must account for patterns
observed across time and space.
2) a very long-run perspective facilitates capturing enough ‘rare events’, such as major financial disloca-
tions and ‘macroeconomic disasters’, to robustly analyze their impacts on the volatility and persistence of
real business cycles.
3) the political database includes more than 800 elections enabling our model to control for a Govern-
ment’s political strength which is pivotal to successful implementation of macro-financial policies.
Even though the political data set of Funke et al. (2016) contains data for 20 countries, we had to sacrifice
the data for three countries during the data merging process.
4. Empirical Design
At the outset, we extensively analyze the dependent variables in our study i.e. house prices, equity
prices, construction costs and residential land prices using summary statistics, a visual scrutiny, and a basic
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ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Afterwards we perform our main statistical exercise using a local
projection technique suggested by Jorda´ (2005) and subsequently adopted in Jorda´ et al. (2015) and Jorda´
et al. (2016). We finally provide a battery of robustness checks to examine our results.
Following Mian et al. (2014), we start our diagnosis of dependent variables by comparing their values in
pre-crisis with post-crisis spells. In this regard, we use a similar method to Funke et al. (2016) as we restrict
the sample to a full five year pre-financial crisis and post-financial crisis excluding the crisis year itself. In the
case of sequel crises, where five-year pre-crisis and post-crisis periods overlap, we exclude subsequent crises
as we consider them as the after-effect of the preliminary crisis. We further omit crisis events coinciding
with global wartime periods from 1914 to 1918 and from 1939 to 1949. After removing all the crisis periods,
we consider 63 out of 96 periods (see Appendix Table A3 for our descriptive analysis).
We then perform fixed effect panel regression of our full sample to compare crisis times to non-crisis
times. This enables us to tease out post-crisis deviations from the long-run historical average over more
than 140 years of data. Particularly, we undertake a very basic model where our dependent variables, i.e.
house prices and equity prices (represented as Yit) regressed on post-crisis indicator variable (postit), as:
Yit = α+ β × postit + µi + εit, (1)
where, the indicator variable postit takes the value of 1 in each of the five years after a crisis event. Unlike
our descriptive analyses, post-crisis years include all years within the five years following a financial crisis
event. Only country fixed effects µi included to allow for unobserved country specific heterogeneity. Hence,
we include 90 out of 96 crisis periods for our OLS analysis (see Appendix Table A3). We remove all the
crisis and follow-ups that began during global wartime.
After these two preliminary diagnoses of dependent variables, we enter into our main empirical analysis
to calculate dynamic multipliers by implementing Jorda´ (2005)’s local projection technique. These days,
the local projection method is gaining popularity for some of its favorable properties. This technique can
tackle asymmetries, nonlinearities and richer data structures with great convenience (Funke et al., 2016).
The method is more robust to model misspecifications, provides appropriate inference (point-wise and joint)
that does not require asymptotic delta-method approximations or numerical techniques for its calculation,
and can easily accommodate experimentation with flexible specifications that may be impractical in a
multivariate context (Jorda´, 2005). Following Funke et al. (2016) and Jorda´ et al. (2013), we distinguish
between financial and non-financial recessions (without major financial disruption). Since financial crises and
recessions are usually coupled, we might fail to understand that the housing and equity market environment
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that a country experiences after a financial crisis are mainly a function of the recession and independent
of the financial crisis. Hence, as can be seen from Appendix Table A4, in the chronology of a business
cycle, we distinguish between non-financial business cycle peaks (denoted as ‘N’) and peaks associated with
a systematic financial crisis (represented by ‘F’). A reduced form of this table is separately presented in
Appendix Table A5, which includes a subsample of crises connected with severely non-financial recessions
i.e. macro disasters. As with earlier instances, we exclude wartime periods.
A major limitation of fixed effect regression presented above is that it considers every crisis identically.
Nonetheless, since economies are complicated dynamic entities, such an approach may not provide sufficient
economic intuition. Therefore, we undertake a local projection technique as this controls for macroeconomic
contexts of the countries, that might affect their post-crisis trajectory. As a proxy for overall macroeconomic
condition, we control for growth in per capita GDP, CPI inflation, long and short run interest rates and
unemployment. Historical data for macroeconomic variables are collected from Jorda´ et al. (2015). Since
the effectiveness of any stabilization policy is dependent on the political strength of a government, we also
control for the vote share of the government in the earlier election. Data of this political variable is salvaged
from Funke et al. (2016). By controlling for macroeconomic and political factors with greater array of
data and dynamics, we make it far less likely that financial crises per se are an independent driver of asset
market reactions and not a function of economic conditions. Following Funke et al. (2016), we calculate
the response from house and equity prices, construction costs and residential land prices by estimating the
following fixed-effects panel model with discrete treatment depending on whether the recession is financial
or not (F, N):
∆hy
k
it+h = α
k
i + θ
k
NN + θ
k
FF + θ
k
DD +
p∑
j=0
ΓkjYit−j + u
k
it; k = 1, ....,K;h = 1, ...., H, (2)
where treatment variables, θkN , θ
k
F and θ
k
D are the occurrence of a normal recession (N=1), financial recession
(F=1) and non-financial disasters (D=1), respectively. It is worth noting here that, the term treatment is
not interpreted in a causal sense. While N and T represent cross sectional and time dimensions of the panel,
Yit is a vector of the macroeconomic and political variables. These controls are introduced in the model with
their lagged values and αki is country fixed effects. For any dependent variable (house prices, construction
costs, residential land prices or equity prices) we will estimate the change in that variable from the beginning
of the recession (previous peak) at time t to time t+h through ∆hy
k
it+h. To elaborate, while t(r) refers to a
peak of economic activities, t(r)+h for h = 1,....,H refers to the subsequent H periods, some of which will be
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recessionary periods (those immediately following t(r)), some of which will be expansionary periods linked
to the recovery from the rth recession. K is the number of variables in the regression system.
4.1. Local projections technique
This paper constructs impulse responses of equation (2) through a local projections method. Impulse
responses (IRFs) within Vector Autoregressive (VAR)-type models measure the reaction of the system to
a shock of interest. Unfortunately, when the underlying data generating process (DGP) cannot be well
approximated by a VAR(p) process, IRFs derived from such a model will be biased and misleading. Jorda´
(2005) introduced an alternative method for computing IRFs based on local projections that do not require
specification and estimation of the unknown true multivariate dynamic system. A distinct advantage of this
approach is the incorporation of nonlinear endogenous variable terms that can still be estimated by ordinary
least squares. Its linear version is immediately comparable to a given VAR setting. It entails estimating:
Yt+h = α
s + Λh+11 yt−1 + Λ
h+1
2 yt−2 + .....+ Λ
h+1
p yt−p + u
h
t+h, (3)
at alternative horizons h = 0, . . . , H, where, again, the local-projections model may be augmented by
the presence of exogenous terms, x. Jorda´ (2005) then shows that impulse responses in the local projection
framework are given by the coefficient matrices Ψh = Λ
s
1 while normalizing the impact response to be, again,
Ψ0 = I.
5. Post-Crisis House and Equity Prices
In this section, we present our findings from the basic descriptive analysis, ordinary least square estima-
tions and local projection followed by some robustness checking exercises. In doing so, we will compare our
findings for pre- and post-crisis, for pre- and post-WWII.
5.1. Basic descriptive analyses of dependent variables
Basic descriptive statistics provide us evidence that the consumer price index rises significantly within five
years of a financial crisis. This is expected because of government’s stabilization efforts through expansionary
policies. However, Figure 2 also suggests that there is very little changes in post-crisis house and stock prices
for the whole period. However, as we have previously identified from Figure 1, both house and stocks prices
reveal different trends between pre- and post-WWII. Hence, we perform basic OLS regressions of post-crisis
prices before and after WWII.
[Figure 2]
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5.2. Post-crisis effects on housing and equity prices
To extend our anecdotal observations from the descriptive study, we have undertaken a fixed-effect panel
regression for house and equity prices on a post-crisis dummy (taking a value of 1 for each of the five
years after the financial crisis). We include all non-crisis years as we want to tease out any deviation in
prices from their long run averages. From the results provided in Table 1, we can find that post-crisis stock
price increases are around 3.25 after the financial crisis and are significant for the whole sample period but
insignificant for either pre- or post-WWII periods. House price increases are significant at the one percent
level with a very small magnitude of 0.26 percent points after the WWII. However, a basic panel fixed effect
regression suffers from severe identification issues. Hence, these results can be considered to be a preliminary
step that warrants a deeper analysis of the post-crisis price paths in these asset markets.
[Table 1]
Figure 3 displays local projections of the cumulative changes in the house price index for years 1-5
after the financial recession (red solid line), controlling for GDP growth rate and CPI inflation (and their
lags). The shaded region represents a 90% confidence interval. Likewise OLS regression: left panel shows
cumulative projection for the whole sample with middle and right panels displaying projections for pre- and
post-WWII periods, respectively. Both for the whole and post-WWII panels, there is a consistent downward
trend in the house price index. The same can be observed in corresponding findings about trends in house
prices from Table 4. On average, for full sample period, the house price index decreases by more than 7%
five years after the financial recession. While there is very little change in post-financial crisis house prices
prior to WWII, in the post-WWII sample house prices fall to more than 14% by the fifth year after a crisis.
This might be due to heightened house prices often resulting in bubbles during post-WWII periods in the
developed world (Jorda´ et al., 2015).
[Figure 3]
We now turn our focus to projecting equity prices. According to Figure 4, irrespective of periods covered
i.e. for full sample, pre-WWII and post-WWII, stock prices display a consistent downward trend after
financial crises. In contrast to house prices, where price responses are different between pre and post-WWII,
stock prices show a similar trend in both pre- and post-WWII indicating absence of ‘bubble’ like events after
WWII in the equity market. Fama (2014) also points out the absence of ‘bubbles’ in equity market in his
Nobel Lecture, while defining ‘bubbles’ as ‘irrational strong price increase that implies a predictable strong
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decline’ (Fama, 2014, p.1475). As revealed by corresponding results in Appendix Table A6, stock prices
decline by more than 7% after two and five years of the financial crisis events for the full and post-WWII
periods, respectively. Our results are robust to adding more control variables such as government vote share,
long and short run interest rates and unemployment rate. We include vote share to allow for a government’s
strength in decision-making and implementation as far as stabilization policies are concerned.
[Figure 4]
Now we dig deeper by projecting both of the components of house prices. Results from our fixed effect
OLS regressions for construction costs and residential land prices are presented in Table 2. As the table
suggests, while the residential land prices (the largest component of house prices) have not experienced
any change, there is a very small increase of only 0.09% in the level of construction costs five years after
crisis in post-WWII period. Figure 5 displays local projections of these two components. Likewise for local
projection results for house prices, both construction costs and residential land prices experience persistent
declines even after five years of the financial crisis. However, while the decrease is immediate for construction
costs, residential land prices drops sharply four years after the crisis. Results in the corresponding Tables
A7 and A9 suggest that, on average, construction costs fall by 2.18% after three years, whereas residential
land prices in the post-WWII sample fall by more than 31% after five years.
[Table 2]
[Figure 5]
We present OLS results for our three major control variables in Table 3. While little happens to short
and long term interest rates, the post-crisis government vote share reduced significantly after World War
II indicating the declining political power of the incumbent government and is indicative of weak policy
implementation regimes. This is consistent with the findings of Funke et al. (2016).
[Table 3]
5.3. How persistent are these effects on prices?
How long lasting are these housing and equity market aftershocks from financial crises? Do these negative
effects fade out with time and stabilization efforts? To find out answers to these questions we extend the
time frame of our local projection exercises to ten years after the crisis event. Fig. 6 presents the post-crisis
path of house prices, stock prices, construction costs and residential land prices over a ten year horizon. The
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graphs reveal that both stock prices and construction costs effects are temporary and diminish over time.
For the overall sample, stock prices takes about eight years and construction costs requires a little more
than ten years to return to their pre-crisis levels. However, impacts on house and residential land prices
seem to be quite persistent.
As indicated by projections of stock prices in the second top panel, stock prices return to pre-crisis levels
earlier in post-WWII than pre-WWII times. With regards to pre-WWII data, it takes almost nine years
for stock prices to return to their pre-crisis level, while in post-WWII periods they return to their original
level within only six years. This might be due to greater interventions by governments in recent years, i.e.
post-WWII periods. Another reason could be the increased ease and frequency in equity market operations
because of rapid advancement in electronic transactions.
There seemed to be no effect of financial crises on house prices and its components before WWII. However
after WWII, all three of these series experienced decreasing trends. While house and residential land prices
are far below the pre-crisis level even after ten years, construction costs are almost back to pre-crisis levels
after twelve years. This could also be due to the fact that any expansionary policy transmits relatively
quickly in row material and supply markets rather than in bigger chunks of wealth component i.e. land
prices. In summary, the equity market consequences of financial crises start to rebound about six to eight
years after the beginning of the crisis, but housing market implications are more persistent. House and
residential land prices do not return to their pre-crisis levels even ten years after the crisis, but effects on
construction costs seem to dissipate after about ten years.
[Figure 6]
5.4. Normal recessions and non-financial macro disasters
In the previous section we showed that financial crises precede a substantial fall in both house and equity
prices. It is now well established in the literature that financial crises are typically accompanied by economic
recessions (Jorda´ et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Funke et al., 2016). In this section, we compare price declines
from financial crises with other episodes of economic downturns. In our local projections we will subject
the economy to three different ‘treatments’ recessions associated with a systemic financial crisis, normal
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recessions, and other (non-financial) macro disasters.2 Table 4 offers local projections of the house price
index during these three economic crisis periods.
[Table 4]
Table 4 indicates that house prices react differently to each of the three distinct crisis periods. Financial
recessions are followed by significantly larger decreases in house prices than either normal recessions or
non-financial macro-disasters. While house prices decline significantly after each of the three crisis types in
the post-WWII period there has been very little movement during any of these crises in pre-WWII periods.
This has macro-economic reasoning. It might be associated with too much leverage in our financial system
in recent years in post-WWII periods. During this period, the F -statistic rejects the null hypothesis of equal
coefficient for all crises at most of the horizons. The only exception is during the inter-war period, where
there has been very little price movement associated with any of the crisis periods.
Table 5 presents coefficients for all three types of crisis for each of the independent variables. To conserve
space, projections are only provided for the post-WWII period. The full set of results is offered in Appendix
Tables A6 through A8. Table 6 shows, the stock price index decreases sharply just after financial recessions
and then rebounds quickly within four years, while the other two crisis types, i.e. normal and disasters, do
not have any impact on equity prices at all. Construction costs and house prices receive a negative shock
in response to each of the three types of crisis. However, the most significant and persistent decline in
construction costs comes from non-financial disasters.
To sum up from Table 5, financial recessions are the most detrimental crises causing substantial decreases
in house prices, stock prices and construction costs. Second, stock prices fall significantly immediately after a
financial crisis and detrimental impacts fade away within four years but shocks to house prices are persistent.
Third, during normal recessions and non-financial macro-disasters, stock prices and residential land prices
remain stable, whereas house prices and construction costs fall.
[Table 5]
As the results suggest, house prices are the most vulnerable against any type of crisis; financial and
normal recessions and non-financial disasters. The persistence of downward trends in house prices can be
2Section 3 of this paper offered a discussion on these three types of crisis. In this regard we follow Jorda´ et al. (2015)
and Funke et al. (2016) in that non-financial disasters are more severe than the typical financial crisis recession, i.e., the
annualized percentage decline in GDP per capita exceeds the respective thresholds of 3.35% (pre-World War II sample) and
2.55% (post-World War II sample). Financial crisis recessions are all recessions that coincide with a systemic financial crisis.
All other recessions are called ’normal recessions’.
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explained by the sheer size and complexity of the housing market. These reasons might restrict expansionary
policies like lowering interest rates, increasing money supply, and more recently implemented quantitative
easing initiatives, to have an immediate impact on prices. The time lag between crisis and policy result
realization is relatively large in the housing market compared to the equity market. Since the purpose
of equity investment is different from housing investment, and equity trading requires relatively smaller
commitment within a relatively fast trading window, any shock has an immediate impact and any monetary
and fiscal policy initiative gets an immediate response, too.
Our results also reveal that financial crises provoke greater disruptions in house and equity prices. As
revealed by Funke et al. (2016), this is also true for political disturbances like increased extremism. This
could be due to a large degree of uncertainty associated with financial crises. Unlike normal recessions and
non-financial disasters, financial crisis events call for more unprecedented policies. Furthermore, compared
to normal recessions due to factors like oil price shocks and nonfinancial disasters like cyclone, financial
recessions attract greater media coverage.
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
This study projects post-crisis (including, financial, normal recessions and non-financial disasters) re-
sponses from housing and equity prices in 17 countries over 143 years. Our analyses suggest that financial
crises, normal recessions and non-financial disasters put immediate downward pressure on house prices,
stock prices and construction costs and a lagged declining effect on residential land prices. However, the
magnitude and persistence of these negative impacts vary across time and asset classes. These findings have
insightful implications as discussed in order.
First, we find that both house prices and construction costs are more vulnerable to crises only after
WWII, while post-crisis stock price declines are detected throughout the whole sample period, i.e. in both
pre- and post-WWII. This difference in timing of impacts between housing and equity market could be due
to recent increased leverage in housing sectors in developed countries. As Jorda´ et al. (2015) indicate, most
of these financial crises are followed by bubble bursting.
Second, with regards to severity of impacts, financial crises seem to be the most detrimental of the three
types of crises causing substantial decreases in house prices, stock prices and construction costs. This could
be because financial crises diffuse more uncertainty about the economic outlook and attracts greater media
speculation. The blurry images about the future lead to declines in both asset prices and construction costs.
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Third, stock prices drop significantly immediately after financial crises and rebound within four to six
years, while shocks to house prices are persistent and the declining trend continues even after ten years
horizon. This contrast in persistence could be because of differences in investor intentions in the two
separate asset markets. Housing investors have a longer-term view than do equity market operators. Since
equity trading requires a relatively smaller commitment within a relatively quick trading window, any macro-
financial shock has an immediate impact. For the same reason, any monetary and fiscal policy initiative
gets an immediate response from the stock market. The persistence of downward pressure in house prices
may also be due to the size and complexity of the housing market which restricts expansionary policies (like
lowering interest rates, increasing money supply, and more recently, quantitative easing initiatives) from
having an immediate impact on prices. Therefore, the time lag between crisis and response to policy is
relatively large in the housing market compared to other asset markets.
In terms of housing and wealth, recovery from recessions may have a social inequality slant, with upper
class families rebounding with a quick stock market recovery but lower middle class families being persis-
tently burdened, years later. Families of low-middle income are more likely to have their wealth wrapped up
in a home, and less in financial investments like stocks. They conventionally are more likely to be pushed
into risky mortgages, and thus into foreclosure, and far more likely to be targeted by predatory lenders.
Controlling for all other factors, the interest rates that low and middle-income families pay for their mort-
gages are, in many instances, higher than those of higher income families. Thus, recession and subsequent
stabilization efforts may amplify the wealth gap and inequality. A deeper insight into these is worthy of
future research.
Fourth, in periods after the Second World War, both house prices and their construction costs drop in
response to all three types of crisis. However, as far as magnitude is concerned, while house prices react
substantially after financial recessions, construction costs fall most after non-financial disasters. This could
be because house prices are more susceptible to uncertainty during adverse financial events, whereas con-
struction costs are more prone to supply disruptions during non-financial disasters like war, transportation
or weather related disruptions.
Fifth, financial crises put substantial downward pressure on residential land prices but with a lag of four
to five years. This decline seems to be persistent. A probable reasoning might be that since residential land
prices are the biggest component of housing wealth and they are traded infrequently, the negative effects
from the crisis are actualized after larger lags than other asset price counterparts.
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Figure 1: Real house prices, equity prices and CPI in the long run.
Note: Nominal house and equity price indexes are divided by consumer price index to get real house prices.
The years of two World Wars are shown with shading
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Figure 2: Pre- and Post-Crisis House, stock and consumer price indexes.
Note: The left panel refers to average house, stock and consumer price indexes in the five
year before the start of a financial crisis, while the right panel reflects average prices five
years after.
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Figure 3: House Price Index (local projection).
Note: Each path shows local projections of the cumulative change relative to peak (in %, y-axis) for years 1-5
of the recession/recovery period (x-axis).The red line refers to the average path in financial crisis recessions and
the shaded region is a 90% confidence interval. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of
the growth rate of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate at peak. The left panel covers the years 1919-
2014, excluding World War II, the middle panel 1919-1938, and the right panel 1950-2014. Table A4 shows the
recessions included. The dependent variable is the house price index. For the corresponding regression results
see Table 4 in the text below.
Figure 4: Stock Price Index (local projection).
Note: Each path shows local projections of the cumulative change relative to peak (in %, y-axis) for years 1-5
of the recession/recovery period (x-axis).The red line refers to the average path in financial crisis recessions and
the shaded region is a 90% confidence interval. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of
the growth rate of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate at peak. The left panel covers the years 1919-
2014, excluding World War II, the middle panel 1919-1938, and the right panel 1950-2014. Table A4 shows the
recessions included. The dependent variable is the stock price index. For the corresponding regression results
see Appendix Table 6 in the text below.
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Figure 5: House Price Components- Construction Cost and Residential Land Prices (Local
Projections): Financial Crisis Recessions.
Note: Each path shows local projections of the cumulative change relative to peak (in %, y-axis) for years 1-5
of the recession/recovery period (x-axis).The red line refers to the average path in financial crisis recessions and
the shaded region is a 90% confidence interval. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of
the growth rate of GDP per capita, the CPI inflation rate and government vote share at peak. The left panels
cover the years 1870-2014, the middle panels 1870-1938, and the right panels 1950-2014. The periods of global
war (1914-1918 and 1939-1949) are excluded. Table A4 shows the recessions included. For the corresponding
regression results refer to Appendix Table E2 and E3.
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Figure 6: 10-year Local Projections: Financial Crisis Recessions.
Note: Each path shows local projections of the cumulative change in the house prices, stock prices, construction
costs and residential land prices relative to peak (in %, y-axis) for years 1-10 of the recession/recovery period
(x-axis). The red line refers to the average path in financial crisis recessions and the shaded region is a 90%
confidence interval. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of the growth rate of GDP per
capita, the CPI inflation rate, long run interest rate, short run interest rate and government vote share at the
peak.
22
Tables
Table 1: House Price and Stock Index: Post-Crisis Years versus
Normal Years
(a) Full Sample (b) Pre-WWII (c) Post-WWII
House Price Index
Post-crisis
0.024 0.027 0.262***∗∗
(0.044) (0.017) (0.083)
R
2 0.012 0.033 0.041
Obs. 1663 672 991
Stock Price Index
Post-crisis
3.276∗ -2.101 1.852
(1.574) (2.317) (1.575)
R
2 0.005 0.003 0.008
Obs. 1917 829 1088
Note: This table compares the post-crisis levels of house price and stock
price indexes to their average levels. The time window for post-crisis is
five years. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parenthe-
ses. The results are similar when controlling for economic fundamentals,
such as the growth rate of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate (not
reported).The left panel covers the years 1870-2013, excluding World War
II, the middle panels 1870-1938, and the right panels 1950-2013. Table A3
shows the crises included. ∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
Table 2: Construction Costs and Residential Land Prices:
Post-Crisis Years versus Normal Years
(a) Full Sample (b) Pre-WWII (c) Post-WWII
Construction Cost
Post-crisis
-0.079 -0.001 0.091∗∗
(0.046) (0.009) (0.027)
R
2 0.015 0.001 0.035
Obs. 1326 444 882
Residential Land Price
Post-crisis
1.519 0.029 1.315
(1.716) (0.027) (1.232)
R
2 0.001 0.001 0.001
Obs. 293 48 245
Note: This table compares the post-crisis levels of Construction Costs and
Residential Land Prices to their average levels. The time window for post-
crisis is five years. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in
parentheses. The results are similar when controlling for economic funda-
mentals, such as the growth rate of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation
rate (not reported).The left panel covers the years 1870-2013, excluding
World War II, the middle panels 1870-1938, and the right panels 1950-2013.
Table A3 shows the crises included. ∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
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Table 3: Control Variables: Post-Crisis versus Normal Years
(a) Full Sample (b) Pre-WWII (c) Post-WWII
Short-term interest rate
Post-crisis
-0.590∗ -0.272 0.073
(0.317) (0.169) (0.517)
R
2 0.071 0.046 0.365
Obs. 2121 1041 1063
Long-term interest rate
Post-crisis
-0.513∗ -0.200 0.678
(0.290) (0.291) (0.517)
R
2 0.077 0.022 0.342
Obs. 2239 1151 1071
Government Vote
Post-crisis
-1.713 -0.178 -3.617∗∗∗
(1.562) (1.566) (1.111
R
2 0.013 0.015 0.042
Obs. 1705 661 1027
Note: This table compares the post-crisis levels of Construction Costs and
Residential Land Prices to their average levels. The time window for post-
crisis is five years. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in
parentheses. The results are similar when controlling for economic funda-
mentals, such as the growth rate of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation
rate (not reported).The left panel covers the years 1870-2013, excluding
World War II, the middle panels 1870-1938, and the right panels 1950-2013.
Table A3 shows the crises included. ∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
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Table 4: Local Projections of House Price Index
(a) Full Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-2.38∗∗∗ -3.91∗∗∗ -5.07∗∗∗ -6.68∗∗∗ -7.14∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.84) (1.15) (1.47) (1.70)
Normal Recession
-1.60∗∗∗ -2.17∗∗∗ -3.00∗∗∗ -3.61∗∗∗ -3.69∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.37) (0.51) (0.51) (0.63)
Non-financial Disaster
-1.57∗∗ -1.39 -3.50∗∗∗ -4.48∗∗∗ -3.78∗∗∗
(0.58) (1.12) (1.15) (1.03) (1.33)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.15
R
2 0.164 0.159 0.153 0.147 1.444
Obs. 1687 1665 1644 1623 1602
(a) Pre-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-1.01 -0.30 -0.08 -0.56 0.60
(0.60) (0.67) (0.62) (0.62) (0.64)
Normal Recession
-0.86∗∗ -0.77∗ -1.13∗ -1.31∗ -0.83
(0.36) (0.40) (0.60) (0.68) (0.71)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.05 0.52 0.01 -0.62 -0.22
(0.66) (0.92) (0.99) (1.07) (0.95)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.83 0.56 0.23 0.41 0.16
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.26 0.55 0.92 0.82 0.44
R
2 0.103 0.158 0.203 0.245 0.291
Obs. 718 713 709 705 701
(a) Post-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-4.11∗∗∗ -8.05∗∗∗ -10.02∗∗∗ -12.46∗∗∗ -14.36∗∗∗
(0.68) (1.46) (1.83) (2.32) (2.61)
Normal Recession
-1.95∗∗∗ -2.31∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -2.54∗∗∗ -2.11∗
(0.34) (0.69) (0.71) (0.78) (1.01)
Non-financial Disaster
-3.31∗∗ -2.43 -5.61∗∗ -5.32∗∗ -1.89
(1.28) (3.31) (2.52) (2.43) (3.86)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.66 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.03
R
2 0.339 0.323 0.317 0.321 0.346
Obs. 969 952 935 918 901
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses. Results correspondent to
local projections of cumulative change in 100 times the logged variable relative to peak for year 1-5
of the financial recession (first row), normal recession (second row), and non-financial macro disaster
(third row). The top panel (a) covers the periods during 1870-2014 excluding World War II years
(1939-1949), the middle panel (b) ranges the years 1870-1938, and the bottom panel (c) covers years
1950-2014. Financial = normal (disaster) tests the null that coefficients for each type of recession
are the same with regards to intercept terms in the first and second (third) rows. In each instance,
p-value is provided. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of the growth of
GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate at peak (coefficients are not reported). See text.∗ p
<0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
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Table 5: Local Projections of all Dependent Variables, Post-World War II Sample
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
House Price Index
Financial Recession
-4.11∗∗∗ -8.05∗∗∗ -10.02∗∗∗ -12.46∗∗∗ -14.36∗∗∗
(0.68) (1.46) (1.83) (2.32) (2.61)
Normal Recession
-1.95∗∗∗ -2.31∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -2.54∗∗∗ -2.11∗
(0.34) (0.69) (0.71) (0.78) (1.01)
Non-financial Disaster
-3.31∗∗ -2.43 -5.61∗∗ -5.32∗∗ -1.89
(1.28) (3.31) (2.52) (2.43) (3.86)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.66 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.03
Stock Price Index
Financial Recession
-14.32∗∗∗ -8.40∗∗∗ -7.11∗∗∗ -7.76∗∗ -4.32
(4.58) (2.30) (2.28) (3.48) (3.13)
Normal Recession
-2.01∗∗ -2.73** -1.42 -2.14 -0.69
(0.93) (1.07) (1.14) (2.25) (2.40)
Non-financial Disaster
-5.62∗ -6.61 -10.35 -13.50 -13.88
(3.03) (4.98) (6.47) (9.13) (8.10)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.16
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.15 0.78 0.57 0.48 0.21
Construction Costs
Financial Recession
-0.32 -1.32∗∗ -2.18∗∗ -2.44∗ -2.30
(0.35) (0.60) (0.89) (1.15) (1.34)
Normal Recession
-0.69∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.87∗
(0.23) (0.47) (0.51) (0.58) (0.61)
Non-financial Disaster
-1.57∗∗∗ -3.77∗∗∗ -3.76∗∗∗ -4.02∗∗ -3.90**
(0.45) (1.17) (1.17) (1.45) (1.56)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.27 0.76 0.63 0.54 0.74
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.38 0.44
Residential Land Prices
Financial Recession
-5.89 -12.89 -17.13 -12.08 -31.27∗∗∗
(3.95) (7.55) (9.23) (10.42) (2.21)
Normal Recession
-0.19 0.26 -0.15 0.55 1.23
(0.52) (1.25) (1.53) (1.72) (2.09)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.47 1.02 2.65 3.49 4.15
(0.47) (0.73) (2.11) (3.16) (2.92)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.00
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.00
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses. Results correspond to local
projections of cumulative change in 100 times the logged variable relative to peak for years 1-5 of the
financial recession (first row), normal recession (second row), and non-financial macro disaster (third
row). The data covers years 1950-2014. Financial = normal (disaster) tests the null that coefficients for
each type of recession are the same with regards to intercept terms in the first and second (third) rows.
In each instance, p-value is provided. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of the
growth of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate at peak (coefficients are not reported). See text.∗
p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
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Appendix
Table A1: Main Variables: Description and Sources
Variable Description Sources
Real House Price Index
Nominal house price index divided by consumer price
index.
Knoll et al. (2017)
Real Construction Cost Index
Nominal construction cost index divided by consumer
price index.
Knoll et al. (2017)
Real Residential Land Price
Index
Nominal residential land price index divided by
consumer price index.
Knoll et al. (2017)
Real Stock Price Index
Nominal stock price index divided by consumer price
index.
Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Systematic Financial Crisis Binary variable for financial crisis events since 1870. Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Recessions
Binary variable for normal recessions since 1870.
Financial recessions: financial crisis within +/-2 years
around peak. Nominal recessions: all non-financial
peaks. Non-financial macro-disasters: normal recessions
with yearly real per capita GDP percentage loss is
greater than average loss in financial recessions.
Funke et al. (2016)
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Inflation Consumer price index Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Short Term Interest Rate Short-term interest rate (nominal, percent per year) Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Long Term Interest Rate Long-term interest rate (nominal, percent per year) Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Current Account Current account (nominal, local currency) Jorda´ et al. (2015).
Investment-to-GDP Ratio Investment-to-GDP ratio Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Government Expenditure Government expenditure (nominal, local currency) Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Total loans to non-Financial
Private Sector
Total loans to non-financial private sector (nominal,
local currency)
Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Total Loans to Households Total loans to households (nominal, local currency) Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Total Loans to Business Total loans to business (nominal, local currency) Jorda´ et al. (2015)
Government vote share
Vote share of governing party or coalition whichever
appropriate in the most recent general elections to the
national parliament (lower chamber).
Funke et al. (2016)
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Table A2: Summery Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
House Prices 1854 0.730718 0.436288 0.007481 3.04466
Stock Prices 2182 9.560855 27.17124 0.023980 232.7631
Construction Costs 1508 0.796783 0.259924 0.160421 1.4875
Residential Land Prices 321 4.116542 18.91574 0.140432 205.663
Real GDP Per Capita 2448 36.61966 30.93255 3.26308 113.343
Consumer Price Index 2448 34.97026 49.67926 1.10e–11 217.943
Short-Term Interest Rate 2285 4.912854 3.195364 0.000102 21.733
Long-Term Interest Rate 2.413 5.613159 3.026959 0.56 23.7154
Total Loans to Non-Financial Private Sector 2247 2262049 1.9e+07 7.6e–12 3.1e+08
Government Expenditure 2366 448444 2.8e+06 5.0e–13 4.5e+07
Total Loans to Business 1183 2363565 1.4e+07 0.2137 1.7e+08
Government Vote Share 1854 50.3444 14.3498 12.3 100
Note: Summary statistics refer to the raw data collected for all 17 countries and all years from 1870 to 2014,
including non-democratic spells and periods of global war (1914-1918 and 1939-1949). Generally not considered
in the empirical analysis of political variables are Austria and Ireland prior to World War I, and Australia
prior to 1901 (no independent states). Finland prior to 1917, as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire, is
considered.
Table A3: Financial Crisis Events, 1870–2014
Australia 1893 1989
Belgium 1870 1885 1925 1931 1939∗ 2008
Canada 1873 1907 1923
Denmark 1877 1885 1908 1921 1931 1987 2008
Finland 1878 1900 1921 1931 1991
France 1882 1889 1907 1930 2008
Germany 1873 1891 1901 1907 1931 2008
Italy 1873 1887 1893 1907 1921 1930 1935∗ 1990 2008
Japan 1882 1900 1904∗ 1907 1913 1927 1992
Netherlands 1893 1907 1921 1939∗ 2008
Norway 1899 1922 1931 1988
Portugal 1890 1920 1923∗ 1931 2008
Spain 1883 1890 1913 1920 1924∗ 1931 1978 2008
Sweden 1878 1907 1922 1931 1991 2008
Switzerland 1870 1910 1931 1991 2008
UK 1873 1890 1974 1984 1991 2007
USA 1873 1884 1893 1907 1929 1984 2007
Note: This table is reproduced from Funke et al. (2016) who have collated financial crisis events
from Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b), Laeven and Valencia (2008), Laeven
and Valencia (2012), and Jord et al. (2013). These financial crisis events are systematic banking
crises that took place since 1870 in 17 countries of our sample. * = crises removed from OLS
regressions. Italic = crises removed from the descriptive analysis.
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Table A4: Financial Recessions (F) and Normal Recessions (N), 1870-2014
Australia
N 1875 1878 1981 1883 1885 1887 1889 1896 1898 1900 1904
1910 1913 1926 1938 1943 1951 1956 1961 1973 1976 1981
2008
F 1891 1894 1989
Belgium
N 1872 1874 1887 1890 1900 1913 1916 1942 1951 1957 1974
1980 1992 2011
F 1870 1883 1926 1930 1937 2008
Canada
N 1871 1877 1882 1888 1891 1894 1903 1913 1917 1928 1944
1947 1953 1956 1981 1989 2007
F 1874 1907
Denmark
N 1870 1880 1887 1911 1914 1923 1939 1944 1950 1962 1973
1979 1992 2011
F 1872 1876 1883 1920 1931 1987 2007
Finland
N 1870 1883 1890 1898 1907 1913 1916 1938 1941 1943 1952
1957 1975 2008 2011
F 1876 1900 1929 1989
France
N 1872 1874 1892 1894 1896 1900 1905 1907 1909 1912 1916
1920 1926 1933 1937 1939 1942 1974 1992 2012
F 1882 1929 2007
Germany
N 1879 1898 1905 1913 1922 1943 1966 1974 1980 1992 2001
2012
F 1875 1890 1908 1928 2008
Italy
N 1870 1883 1897 1918 1923 1925 1932 1939 1974 2002 2004
2010
F 1873 1887 1891 1929 1992 2007
Japan
N 1875 1877 1880 1887 1890 1892 1895 1898 1903 1919 1921
1929 1933 1940 1973 2001 2007 2010
F 1874 1901 1907 1913 1925 1997
Netherlands
N 1870 1873 1877 1889 1894 1899 1902 1913 1929 1957 1974
1980 2001 2011
F 1892 1906 1937 1939 2008
Norway
N 1876 1881 1885 1893 1902 1916 1923 1939 1941 1957 1981
2007 2012
F 1897 1920 1930 1987
Portugal
N 1870 1873 1877 1888 1893 1900 1904 1907 1912 1914 1916
1925 1927 1934 1937 1939 1941 1944 1947 1951 1973 1982
1992 2002 2004 2010
F 1890 1923 1929 2007
Spain
N 1873 1877 1892 1894 1901 1909 1911 1916 1927 1932 1935
1940 1944 1947 1952 1958 1974 1980 1992 2011
F 1883 1889 1913 1925 1929 1978 2007
Sweden
N 1873 1876 1881 1883 1885 1888 1890 1899 1901 1904 1913
1916 1924 1939 1976 1980 2011
F 1878 1907 1920 1930 1990 2007
Switzerland
N 1875 1880 1886 1890 1893 1899 1902 1906 1912 1916 1920
1933 1939 1947 1951 1957 1974 1981 1994 2001
F 1871 1929 1990 2008
UK
N 1875 1877 1891 1883 1896 1899 1902 1907 1918 1925 1929
1938 1943 1951 1957 1979 2010
F 1873 1889 1973 1990 2007
USA
N 1875 1887 1889 1895 1901 1909 1913 1916 1918 1926 1937
1944 1948 1953 1957 1969 1973 1979 1981 1990 2000
F 1873 1882 1892 1906 1929 2007
Note: This table is reproduced from Funke et al. (2016)
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Table A5: Non-financial Macro-Economic Disasters, 1870-2014
Australia 1881 1889 1896 1926 1981
Belgium 1913 1916 1942
Canada 1877 1884 1913 1917 1928 1944 1953 1981
Denmark 1877 1884 1914 1916 1939 1944 1953 1981
Finland 1890 1913 1916 1938 2008 2011
France 1892 1909 1912 1920 1939 1942 2012
Germany 1879 1913 1922 1943
Italy 1918 1939 1974 2010
Japan
1880 1887 1890 1895 1898 1919 1929 1940
1973 2007
Netherlands 1873 1913
Norway 1873 1916 1939 1941
Portugal 1916 1927 1934 1939 1973
Spain 1873 1877 1894 1909 1935
Sweden 1916 1939
Switzerland 1875 1890 1893 1916 1920 1939 1957 1974
UK 1907 1918 1925 1929 1943
USA 1895 1913 1918 1937 1944 1957 1981
Note: This table is reproduced from Funke et al. (2016). It shows a sub-sample of
non-financial macro-economic disasters from the normal recessions listed in Table
A4. Non-financial macro-economic disasters are defined as normal recessions
where the yearly real per capita GDP percentage loss is higher than the average
in financial crisis recessions. Thresholds are calculated separately for the pre-
World War II sample (-3.35%) and the post-World War II sample (-2.55%).
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Table A6: Local Projections of Stock Prices Index
(a) Full Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-7.87∗∗∗ -7.21∗∗∗ -6.44 -5.25 -5.01
(2.11) (2.46) (3.76) (3.75) (2.88)
Normal Recession
-1.62∗∗∗ -2.64∗∗ -1.87 -1.44 -1.39
(0.50) (0.97) (1.09) (1.72) (1.74)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.93 -3.42 -4.79∗ -2.88 -3.11
(1.63) (2.52) (2.47) (2.76) (2.55)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.01 0.15 0.26 0.31 0.25
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.02 0.43 0.77 0.55 0.62
R
2 0.069 0.088 0.119 0.131 0.149
Obs. 1965 1945 1927 1910 1893
(a) Pre-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-4.46∗∗ -5.65∗ -4.48∗ -1.72 -2.94
(1.76) (3.15) (4.94) (5.06) (3.99)
Normal Recession
-1.80∗ -3.02∗∗ -2.80 -1.71 -2.67
(1.01) (1.05) (1.97) (3.02) (2.51)
Non-financial Disaster
1.21 -2.33 -3.27 -0.67 -0.35
(2.83) (1.81) (2.15) (3.23) (2.19)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.06 0.42 0.70 1.00 0.94
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.12 0.53 0.88 0.56 0.37
R
2 0.088 0.132 0.177 0.187 0.203
Obs. 894 891 890 890 890
(a) Post-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-4.32∗∗∗ -8.40∗∗∗ -7.11∗∗∗ -7.76∗∗ -4.32
(4.58) (2.30) (2.28) (3.48) (3.13)
Normal Recession
-2.01∗∗ -2.73∗∗ -1.42 -2.14 -0.69
(0.93) (1.07) (1.14) (2.25) (2.40)
Non-financial Disaster
-5.62∗ -6.61 -10.35 -13.50 -13.88
(3.03) (4.98) (6.47) (9.13) (8.10)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.16
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.15 0.78 0.57 0.48 0.21
R
2 0.134 0.148 0.201 0.250 0.283
Obs. 1071 1054 1037 1020 1003
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses. Results correspond
to local projections of cumulative change in 100 times the logged variable relative to peak
for year 1–5 of the financial recession(first row), normal recession (second row), and non-
financial macro disaster (third row). The top panel (a) covers the periods during 1870–2014
excluding World War II years (1939–1949), the middle panel (b) ranges the years 1870–1938,
and the bottom panel (c) covers years 1950–2014. Financial = normal (disaster) tests the
null that coefficients for each type of recession are the same with regards to intercept terms
in the first and second (third) rows. In each instance, p-value is provided. The controls are
contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of the growth of GDP per capita and the CPI
inflation rate at peak (coefficients are not reported). See text.∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p
<0.01.
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Table A7: Local Projections of Construction Costs
(a) Full Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-0.52 -1.32∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗ -1.74* -1.61
(0.30) (0.34) (0.64) (0.81) (1.23)
Normal Recession
-0.97∗∗∗ -1.87∗∗∗ -1.92∗∗∗ -1.77∗∗∗ -2.30∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.35) (0.38) (0.41) (0.42)
Non-financial Disaster
-1.13∗∗∗ -2.04∗∗∗ -2.67∗∗∗ -2.70∗∗∗ -2.74∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.58) (0.60) (0.70) (0.72)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.26 0.33 0.74 0.97 0.58
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.35
R
2 0.101 0.099 0.107 0.119 0.143
Obs. 1345 1328 1311 1295 1279
(a) Pre-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-0.40 -0.68 -0.32 0.01 0.12
(0.55) (0.81) (1.31) (1.74) (1.94)
Normal Recession
-1.01∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗ -0.67∗∗ -1.63∗∗
(0.34) (0.53) (0.37) (0.24) (0.58)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.48 -0.27 -1.02 -0.72 -0.73
(0.38) (0.49) (0.86) (0.85) (0.83)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.27 0.36 0.58 0.69 0.38
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.65 0.80 0.51 0.66 0.59
R
2 0.135 0.180 0.191 0.203 0.240
Obs. 477 474 471 469 467
(a) Post-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-0.32 -1.32∗∗ -2.18∗∗ -2.44∗ -2.30
(0.35) (0.60) (0.89) (1.15) (1.34)
Normal Recession
-0.69∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.87∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.47) (0.51) (0.58) (0.61)
Non-financial Disaster
-1.57∗∗∗ -3.77∗∗∗ -3.76∗∗∗ -4.02∗∗ -3.90∗∗
(0.45) (1.17) (1.17) (1.45) (1.56)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.27 0.76 0.63 0.54 0.74
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.38 0.44
R
2 0.189 0.214 0.240 0.258 0.278
Obs. 868 854 840 826 812
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses. Results correspond to
local projections of cumulative change in 100 times the logged variable relative to peak for year
1–5 of the financial recession(first row), normal recession (second row), and non-financial macro
disaster (third row). The top panel (a) covers the periods during 1870–2014 excluding World
War II years (1939–1949), the middle panel (b) ranges the years 1870–1938, and the bottom
panel (c) covers years 1950–2014. Financial = normal (disaster) tests the null that coefficients
for each type of recession are the same with regards to intercept terms in the first and second
(third) rows. In each instance, p-value is provided. The controls are contemporaneous and 1-year
lagged values of the growth of GDP per capita and the CPI inflation rate at peak (coefficients
are not reported). See text.∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
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Table A8: Local Projections of Residential Land Price
(a) Full Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-5.83 -12.30 -16.40 -13.05 -24.69∗∗
(2.92) (6.50) (8.49) (7.57) (6.33)
Normal Recession
-0.80 -0.50 -1.18 -1.18 -0.75
(0.48) (1.08) (1.19) (1.46) (1.98)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.51 1.50 -2.45 -3.53 -5.14
(0.31) (1.11) (2.80) (4.39) (4.33)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.03
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.00
R
2 0.284 0.277 0.279 0.255 0.240
Obs. 269 263 257 251 245
(a) Pre-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-1.33 -1.40 -0.29 -1.66 -1.46
(0.82) (0.99) (0.08) (0.63) (0.67)
Normal Recession
-0.63 -0.84 -0.82 -0.32 1.34
(0.19) (0.37) (0.76) (1.54) (0.89)
Non-financial Disaster
-1.16 0.95 -1.80 -4.12 -1.74
(2.07) (3.43) (3.44) (2.40) (4.99)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.47 0.17 0.58 0.38 0.05
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.96 0.46 0.66 0.51 0.97
R
2 0.446 0.460 0.593 0.624 0.633
Obs. 47 47 47 47 47
(a) Post-WWII Sample Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5
Financial Recession
-5.89 -12.89 -17.13 -12.08 -31.27∗∗∗
(3.95) (7.55) (9.23) (10.42) (2.21)
Normal Recession
-0.19 0.26 -0.15 0.55 1.23
(0.52) (1.25) (1.53) (1.72) (2.09)
Non-financial Disaster
-0.47 1.02 2.65 3.49 4.15
(0.47) (0.73) (2.11) (3.16) (2.92)
H0: Financial=Normal;p-value 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.00
H0: Financial=Disaster;p-value 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.00
R
2 0.308 0.326 0.355 0.361 0.383
Obs. 222 216 210 204 198
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses. Results correspond
to local projections of cumulative change in 100 times the logged variable relative to peak
for year 1–5 of the financial recession(first row), normal recession (second row), and non-
financial macro disaster (third row). The top panel (a) covers the periods during 1870–2014
excluding World War II years (1939–1949), the middle panel (b) ranges the years 1870–1938,
and the bottom panel (c) covers years 1950–2014. Financial = normal (disaster) tests the
null that coefficients for each type of recession are the same with regards to intercept terms
in the first and second (third) rows. In each instance, p-value is provided. The controls are
contemporaneous and 1-year lagged values of the growth of GDP per capita and the CPI
inflation rate at peak (coefficients are not reported). See text.∗ p <0.10, ∗∗ p <0.05, ∗∗∗ p
<0.01.
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A9: More on Crises Explained: Normal Recessions, Financial Crisis and Non-Financial Recessions
Following Funke et al. (2016) and Jorda´ et al. (2013) this study identifies recessions according to the Bry and
Boschan (1971) algorithm. The algorithm for annual frequency data follows an easy process for identifying local
minima in an upward trending real GDP per capita. Each minimum is labelled as a trough and the preceding
maximum as a peak. Recessions are identified as the period between a peak and a subsequent trough and expansions
are characterized in the opposite way, trough-to-peak.
First, the recession years were sorted into financial crisis recession ‘F’ which coincide with a major financial
crisis (identification of financial crisis are discussed in section 3) and normal recessions ‘N’ - those with no proximity
to financial crisis, per se. More specifically, we call a recession financial if a major financial crisis erupts within the
two year window (before or after) a peak of the cycle. This benchmarking exercise between normal and financial
recessions offers us with cleaner identification of the effects of financial crises instead of comparing financial crises
years to a counterfactual of all other years.
As the final step of sorting recessions; since normal recessions are usually less acute than financial recessions, we
also compare financial recession to a subset of normal recessions that are particularly deep. Hence, in the spirit of
Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursu´a (2012) this study performs a second benchmarking exercise to compare the asset
price aftermath of financial recessions with sever non-financial recessions (popularly named as ‘rare macroeconomic
disaster’).These deep recessions are more severe than average financial crisis recession, i.e., the yearly percentage
fall in GDP per capita exceeds the respective threshold of 3.35% in pre-WWII and 2.55% in post-WWII samples.
Accordingly in local projections, this study has subjected the economies to three different ‘treatments’: recessions
coupled with a systematic financial crisis, normal recessions and other (non-financial) macro disasters.
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